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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the basic procedures and institutions of American adoption law
emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century, Americans have perceived
adoption in largely positive ways. Thanks to adoption, needy children find new
homes. Through adoption, admirable would-be parents are able to expand their
families in ways they find highly desirable. Adoption in the popular mind glows
with love, commitment and family harmony.
In many individual cases both in the past and in the present this image of
adoption is accurate, but adoption also has goals and purposes less likely to warm
the heart. Adoption, after all, is not just a series of happy individual stories but also
a large, complex social program. Throughout American adoption's modem history
- the period from roughly 1850 to the present - legislators, judges and state
functionaries have used adoption to address societal needs and preferences,
especially as perceived by the most powerful classes. Some of the goals and
purposes of adoption and the concomitant instrumental use of the law might give us
pause.
This article will begin in Part II by considering briefly the enactment of
modem adoption procedures in the mid- and late-nineteenth century. This rapid and
widespread enactment relates in good part to changes in labor markets and
employment relationships. With indentured servitude and apprenticeships no longer
available for abandoned or orphaned children, adoption emerged as a viable
alternative. However, newly adopted children did not become full and equal
members of their new families, and the law initially continued to distinguish
between adopted and biological children with reference to property rights,
especially inheritance.
*
R. Bruce Townsend Professor of Law and Professor of Liberal Arts, Indiana University/Purdue
University at Indianapolis. A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D. in American Studies,
University of Michigan. The author thanks Professor Lisa Kelly of the West Virginia University College of
Law for inviting him to participate in this symposium.
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Part III of the article scrutinizes not the enactment of modem adoption
laws but rather their use in tum-of-the-century America. The adoption system in
this period intertwined with the elitist goal of "child-saving." The children taken to
be in need of saving almost always hailed from non-Anglo-Saxon, working-class,
immigrant families. Social workers could pluck these children from their homes
and, through adoption, see them placed into the homes of the dominant classes.
The largest part of the article, Part IV, addresses the refinement of
American adoption law by legislators and judges in the later decades of the
twentieth century. During this period adoption became part of a society rippled by
advanced consumption. Vulnerable to the marketers and advertisers among them,
most Americans sought happiness through the things and the services they might
acquire. Refined adoption laws served the interests of the middle and upper classes
in the acquisition of children they could legally call their own.
This article's history of American adoption law is not intended to
invalidate or undermine adoption as a sociolegal institution. The goal instead is to
enhance critical thinking about adoption. Adoption law of the new century will also
have societal goals and purposes. It also will be more than a collection of individual
success stories. Pondering the past might help us shape and understand twentyfirst-century adoption law.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN ADOPTION

The adoption laws and processes we today take for granted in general date
from the 1850s, the decade immediately before the Civil War.1 From our point in
time 150 years later the debates over slavery and the possibility of secession
perhaps most mark the decade. However, other controversies raged, and other
transformations were evident in the 1850s. In the non-slavery states alone, the
economic system was being restructured. Merchants and manufacturers were
interring once and for all an older variety of labor servitude and apprenticeship. An
era of "free labor" had begun, and this change contributed to a new and expanded
role for adoption in American society.
In order to understand this new role, it is helpful to drop back even further
in time. During the American Colonial Period and in the early years of the Republic
adoption had been rare. Abandoned or orphaned children were merely placed with
members of extended families if that was possible. Children also found new family
environments through "bounding out," indentured service or apprenticeships. 2
These three possibilities were interrelated but still distinguishable. "Bound
out" children were taken in by strangers with the expectation that the children
would provide useful child labor.3 Indentured service for children was a venerable
practice, resting on the presumption that a child owed service to his or her parents
I

See Stephen B. Presser, The HistoricalBackground of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM.

L. 443, 461 (1971).
2
See id.at 456.
3

See id. at 558-59.
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and buoyed by the corollary that parents could assign this service to others.4 The
assignee then stood in the shoes of the parents, receiving a child's services in return
for support. 5 Apprenticeships were even more formal and structured. Masters
contracted with parents or the other relatives of a child if the parents were dead. In
the contracts the masters promised training in a trade or craft in exchange for
service.'
Perhaps predictably, there are indications that children in all of these
arrangements were exploited and provided with something far short of stable,
nurturing homes. "Bounding out," indentured service and apprenticeships all had as
much to do with economics as with the well-being of children. Indeed, a market for
child labor existed, and some parents and temporary custodians unflinchingly
advertised the availability of children who could provide that labor.'
Only a small number of the children "bound out," placed in service or
apprenticed were formally adopted. In the first decades of the nineteenth century,
adoptions, to the extent they took place, were finalized through private legislative
acts. 8 That is, a sponsor of those willing to adopt a child sought approval of the
adoption from their legislative colleagues, and legislatures occasionally enacted
private legislation stating that a given child had become a member of a given
family. But still, "bounding out," indentured service and apprenticeship were all
much more common.9
Adoption began to change and become more common in the 1850s, and
the Massachusetts adoption act of 1851 is usually cited as the first modem,
comprehensive adoption law. 10 This statute included certain of the core features of
American adoption which remain in force today. It required that living biological
parents of the child give formal permission for adoption and that both the adopter
and his spouse (if any) formally petition to adopt.1 A judge then made the adoption
decision, asking in the process if the adoption petitioner or petitioners were "of
12
sufficient ability to bring up the child" and if the adoption was "fit and proper.
"The heart of the adoption transfer," the historian Jamil Zainaldin has stated,
"became the judicially monitored transfer of rights with due regard for the welfare
4

See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-

CENTURY AMERICA 259 (1985).
5

See id.

6

See id. Fifteen percent of the inmates in New York's almshouse of the 1730s were deserted or

orphaned children hoping for apprenticeships. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE AsYLUM:
SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER INTHE NEW REPUBLIC 39 (1971; rev. ed. 1990).
7

See Presser, supranote 1,at 460.

8

See id. at 461.

9

See generally Presser, supranote 1,at 461-63.
See id. at 465; GROSSBERG, supra note 4, at 271.

10

Adoption of Children, Massachusetts Acts of 1851, ch. 324, §§ 2, 4 (respectively). The statute also
stated that no married woman was competent to petition. See id. at § 4.
12
See id. at § 5.
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of the child and the parental qualifications of the adopters. 13
During the next few decades other states followed the Massachusetts lead
and enacted general adoption laws utilizing the courts. 4 Pennsylvania enacted a
modem adoption law in 1853.5 By 1876, twenty-four states had similar
legislation, 16 and by the turn of the century something resembling modem adoption
was available in every state. 7
What explains this striking and widespread acceptance of new approaches
to and expanded utilization of adoption? The influential Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania laws perhaps played some role, but more general forces were also at
work. Government was coming to assume a larger role in the lives of Americans,
and Americans increasingly expected to rely on general governmental procedures
rather than individualized legislative acts.1 8 Divorce, for example, had also become
a matter of judicial decree rather than a private legislative act,' 9 and those seeking
to incorporate also relied increasingly on not individual legislative acts but rather
standard processes and administrative agencies.20
More fundamentally, changes in the relationship between workers and
employers had an impact on how and why Americans placed children in new
families. In the context of a booming capitalist economy, independent labor
increasingly supplanted older forms of workplace dependency. While in 1820 wage
earners were a minority, by 1870 two-thirds of all working Americans were wage
earners. A "free labor" ideology took hold in the American North and Midwest,
and it stressed the way honest, diligent, sober labor could lead to economic and
civic independence.22 Against this backdrop, indentured service and
apprenticeships in which young apprentices actually lived with masters' families
seemed increasingly anomalous.
Where could unwanted, abandoned and orphaned children be placed? If
13

Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption

and the Courts, 1776-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1979).
14

See id.

is

See GROSSBERG, supra note 4, at 272.

16

See Presser, supra note 1, at 443.

17

See GROSSBERG, supra note 4, at 272.

18

See Zainaldin, supranote 13, at 1043.

19

See id.

20

See DAVID RAY PAPKE, THE PULLMAN CASE: THE CLASH OF LABOR AND CAPITAL IN INDUSTRIAL

AMERICA 5
21

(1999).

See

Richard Oestreicher,

Labor: The Jacksonian Era Through Reconstruction, in 2

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY 1447 (Mary Kupiec Cayton et al. eds., 1993).

22

Works exploring the "free-labor ideology" include but are not limited to: ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL,

FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970);

JONATHAN A. GLICKSTEIN, CONCEPTS OF FREE LABOR IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICAN (1991); ROBERT J.
STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870 (1991).
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systems of servitude and apprenticeship no longer seemed appropriate, were other
places and processes conceivable? The state could have relied on reformatories,
asylums and other institutions, and to some extent this was done.23 But this
approach of course meant added public expense. Adoption, by contrast, had the
advantage of placing children in families with the expense of feeding and raising
the children falling on those families rather than the state.
To be sure, the states did not require families to adopt, and many children
did find love and genuine support in their new families. Yet the use of adoption as a
societal mechanism to adjust for changing worker-employer relationships should
not be overlooked. The adoption statutes and procedures of the second half of the
nineteenth century were not only "modem" in and of themselves but also part of a
larger socioeconomic modernization.
Note in this regard that during this period adoptive children maintained a
status still reminiscent of their social origins. Most were crossing in the process of
adoption from a lower socioeconomic situation to a higher one, and the law
underscored the significance of this crossing by denying equal property rights to
the newly adopted. William Whitmore, the author of an 1876 treatise on adoption
law, observed on the very first page of his work that "the adopting parent is often
but the medium of transmission of property acquired by persons neither cognizant
of nor consenting to the act of adoption." 24 To speak of one's "flesh and blood" was
not a metaphorical expression as it often is today. Adopted children were in a sense
second-class children, loved and part of a family in most cases but not the same
under the law as children born of the family.2'
This distinction was most evident with regard to inheritance. 26 Courts in
Massachusetts and elsewhere tended to construe adoption statutes strictly, the
assumption being that these laws were "in derogation of the common law." 27
Without specific directions to the contrary and sometimes even with such
directions, the probate judges charged with overseeing adoptions were inclined to
resolve inheritance disputes in favor of "blood" relatives. 28 Adoptees were able to
inherit in many instances, especially when there were no biological children or
probate contests, but controversy could and did arise.
Indeed, the range of cases involving the inheritance rights of adoptees is
intriguing. Many involved issues other than simple contests between adoptees and
blood relatives, and Whitmore was able in his treatise to report a sizable case law.29
It concerned tax exemptions for adoptees, attempts by adoptees to claim against
23

See ROTHMAN, supranote 6, at 206-10.

24

WILLIAM

H.

WHITMORE, THE LAW OF ADOPTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ESPECIALLY IN

MASSACHUSETrS at iii (1876).
See generally GROSSBERG, supra note 4, at 272.
25

26

See id.

27

See Presser, supra note 1, at 510.

28

See id.
at 511.

29

See WHITMORE, supranote 24, at 35-65.
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widows' estate shares, and the rights of adoptees' own blood siblings to claim
against adoptees' estates. 3o Historian Michael Grossberg accurately observes that,
"Inheritance claims by adopted children were the most heavily litigated adoption
issue. 31
The values and perceptions of a rapidly modernizing society are evident in
this litigation. Unwanted, abandoned and orphaned children remained part of the
social landscape, but older systems of servitude and apprenticeship no longer
existed to accommodate them. Under the new adoption statutes and processes, at
least some of these children became members of new families, but the adopted
children had a different status in these new families than did biological children and
other "blood" relatives.
III. PROGRESSIVE ADOPTION

In turn-of-the-century America many of the social trends that had begun
earlier accelerated rapidly. Cities grew by leaps and bounds, and the 1920 census
was the first to show a majority of Americans living in urban areas.32 Foreign
immigration to the United States not only increased rapidly but also included large
numbers of eastern and southern Europeans, whose languages, religions and even
physical appearances did not blend easily into the Anglo-Saxon American
mainstream. 3 The industrial development, which had begun before the Civil War
with mills on New England rivers, now included huge industrial plants employing
by 1900 over one-third of the entire workforce. 34 The cities housed most of the
immigrants, who in turn sought jobs in the factories. What role might adoption play
in the tumultuous, late-modem society the United States was becoming?
One answer involves the progressive movement and its commitment to
"child-saving." Complex and many-sided, the progressive movement was evident
on local, state, and federal levels. The movement's leaders customarily took
themselves to be particularly knowledgeable about the new American society's
components and ways. Their self-styled knowledge included a sense of children
and ideas about how those children should be raised, disciplined, and educated. In
the words of David J. Rothman, "Progressive programs were to a remarkable
degree child-oriented."''
In more specific terms, many progressives accepted and promoted an
understanding of children quite different than the one of earlier epochs. In the
30

See id.

31

See GROSSBERG, supra note 4, at 275.

32

See MARY BETH NORTON ET AL., 2 A

33

See id. at 514.

34

See ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE

PEOPLE AND A NATION

688 (1986).

GILDED AGE 87 (1982).
35

See DAVID

J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE, THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
[hereinafter ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE].

IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 206 (1970)
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premodem era children had not been as fully differentiated conceptually from
adults, and many took boys and girls to simply be smaller and younger men and
women. Only in modem times did childhood come to be seen as a more distinct
and even crucial stage of life. Parents and social commentators began to perceive
children as "innocent, delicate, and malleable human beings with a psychology and
emotion all their own."37 By the turn of the century this new perception of
childhood was more pronounced in the United States than anywhere in the world.38
Within the United States the perception was most accepted in progressive circles.
The new sense of children could combine with anxiety regarding tum-ofthe-century societal change and turmoil, and some progressives in fact saw children
as the cure for the nation's ills.39 If children could be provided with proper
education, discipline and values, if they could be "saved," urban problems, ethnic
divisions and industrial workplace tensions could perhaps be replaced by
cooperation, harmony and common values. 40 According to historian Susan Tiffin,
"Successful socialization and education of the American child was central to the
Progressive vision ,4'

Well-intentioned children's aid societies began "saving" children in the
late 1800s, and their efforts were extended by legislators and social workers in
subsequent decades. Perhaps the most active of the societies was New York City's
Children's Aid Society, which had been founded by Charles Loring Brace. The
Society "gathered up homeless children from the streets and sent them into the
country - many to the Midwest - to work and build character on clean, honest,
Protestant farms. 42 As of 1892, the Society had "farmed out" an amazing 84,318
children.43
Even after questions surfaced about consigning impoverished ethnic
children to farm labor, self-styled "child-savers" continued to see value in juvenile
rehabilitation in rural areas. William R. George, for example, was a businessman
from upstate New York with commitments to helping children from New York
City's Lower East Side.44 In the 1890s he developed a rural settlement near
Freeville, New York, in which city children were to live according to republican
3

See DAVID HUNT, PARENTS AND CHILDREN INHISTORY 33-34 (1970).

37

See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 163 (1989).

8

See Zainaldin, supranote 13, at 1050.

See id.
40

See SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE

ERA 7 (1982).
41
Id.
42

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 433 (1973). For a complete study of

the Children's Aid Society, see MIRIAM Z. LANGSAM, CHILDREN WEST: A HISTORY OF THE PLACING-OUT
SYSTEM OF THE NEW YORK CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY, 1853-1890 (1964).

43

See FRIEDMAN, supranote 42, at 434.

44

See JACK M. HOLL, JUVENILE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: WILLIAM R. GEORGE
AND THE

JUNIOR REPUBLIC MOVEMENT 86-87 (1971).
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principles. 45 In this so-called "Junior Republic," delinquent children learned the
value of hard work and democratic participation.46 Some of the children no doubt
realized they were incarcerated, but perhaps it was nevertheless inspiring to elect
their own officers and write their own mock laws.
Adult legislators, meanwhile, produced a raft of real laws and programs to
save children. The progressives, David J. Rothman reminds us, "were not afraid to
introduce the coercive force of law. 47 Unlike the moral and religious reformers of
the first half of the nineteenth century, progressives believed better statutes and
legal institutions were the key to improving society.
The range of new laws and legal institutions is impressive. Legislation,
among other things, extended compulsory school attendance; restricted child labor;
barred the sale of guns, alcohol, and tobacco to children; prohibited gambling in the
presence of minors; and criminalized parental desertion and physical abuse. New
agencies and institutions included various types of state and local youth homes and
also the much discussed and praised juvenile court. Chicago established the first
juvenile court in Chicago in 1899.48 Within five years juvenile courts existed in ten
additional states, and by the end of World War I only three states were without
juvenile courts.49 On the federal level, Congress created the Children's Bureau in
1912.50 It was the first federal agency devoted to children and represented a
culmination of sorts of the progressive movement's determination to "save"
children. The Bureau collected and published information on child welfare, ran
seminars and conferences, conducted research studies, and attempted generally to
bring national attention to the plight of children.
Acting under the new laws and buoyed by data showing the need for their
work, social workers, truant officers and police began to enter the homes of
families perceived as failures and investigate the raising of children in those homes.
Progressive reformers and the men and women who carried out their mission, in
other words, were quite prepared "to pry into family affairs. 5 1 What's more, the
state was willing to remove children from the homes, both physically and later in a
legal sense through a courtroom proceeding. According to early twentieth-century
reformers Sophonisba P. Breckinridge and Edith Abbott, a court taking this step
"helped to rescue the child from irresponsible parents and.., pointed the way to a

45

See

TIFFIN,

supra note 40, at 82. A book-length study of William George's Junior Republic is

HOLL,supra note 44.
46

See HOLL, supranote 44, at 94-98.

47

See ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE, supranote 35, at 207.

48

See id. at 215. Rothman notes as well that juvenile courts in cities of over 100,000 were more

specialized and likely to have staffs of probation workers. "The juvenile court, like so many Progressive
reforms, had taken root most firmly in the cities." Id. at 238.
See id.
50

See TIFFIN, supranote 40, at 284.

51

See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF

DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS 157

(1978).
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52

new relationship between the family and the community."
The grand rationale for such state intervention was the notion of "parens
patriae," a familiar notion in the present but one which was only beginning to
solidify its conceptual power in turn-of-the-century America. 3 According to
"parens patriae" thinking, the state could require parents to tend to their children's
well being. In addition, the state could act when parents failed to care satisfactorily
for their children. The young, after all, were weak and unable to tend to themselves,
and the state had an immense interest in children developing properly. Put bluntly,
the state had the power to intervene in unsuccessful families and place jeopardized
children from those families into houses of refuge, reformatories, industrial schools
and other institutions in which they were to become better citizens.
Perhaps needless to add, aggressive state action of this sort was most likely
to be directed against working-class and/or immigrant families which seemed not to
embody the values or conduct themselves in the ways preferred by the dominant
classes. A degree of biased social engineering, in other words, was evident in the
efforts of progressive reformers, self-styled "child-savers," social workers and
other agents working for the state. In his study of turn-of-the-century "child-savers"
in Illinois, Anthony Platt concluded that "juvenile delinquency" was largely a label
given by middle and upper-class groups to the behavior of lower-class,
predominantly immigrant children; "[t]he 'invention' of delinquence," Platt
concluded, "consolidated the inferior social status and dependency of lower-class
youth." The "child-saving" movement in general, Platt thought, was a reflection
of an "authoritarian impulse" and had more to do with social control than with
nurturing and empowerment.'
The "child-savers" may have been somewhat more altruistic than Platt
suggests, but at the same time the aggressiveness and intolerance of the "childsavers" should not be underestimated. "Our goals of child protection have changed
entirely since the time of Blackstone," reformer Miriam Van Waters announced in
1927 volume Parents on Probation. "Parents no longer can shield themselves
behind natural rights."' "Child-savers," in Van Waters' mind, were knights in
shining armor, blessed even with a "new sense of chivalry toward childhood." 7
And these knights were prepared to act: "Adults who prove to be stumbling blocks
to the welfare of children must be removed no matter how much pain it causes
them."5 8
52

SOPHONISBA P. BRECKENRIDGE and EDITH ABBOTr, THE DELINQUENT CHILD AND THE HOME

173-74 (1912).
53

See TIFFIN, supra note 40, at 143. See also ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE, supra

note 35, at 221-22.
54

ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 177 (1969).

55

Id at 135.

56

MIRIAM VAN WATERS, PARENTS ON PROBATION 167 (1927).

57

Id.
Id.

58
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Adoption sometimes served as a final stage in the removal of a child from
a disapproved home environment. As previously noted, proceedings instituted by
the state sometimes terminated parental rights regarding a child or sometimes a
whole sibling group. This often left children without parents in a legal sense and
led to placements in orphanages, juvenile homes or industrial schools. Even the
"child-savers" realized, however, that orphanages and industrial schools were
crowded, poorly funded and demoralizing for the children assigned to them.59
Complaints were rife regarding the violence, abuse and lack of rehabilitation in
such institutions.6 °
Adoption struck reformers as a better alternative. Platt indicates that it was
looked to for "child-saving" purposes in Illinois as early as the 1880s.61 Nationally
as well, Michael Grossberg states, adoption became "the favored form of state aid
to children taken from their natural homes. 6 2
Well into the twentieth century the number of children available for
adoption greatly exceeded the number of parents willing to adopt.6 Yet, when
adoption did occur, it was in a sense the ideal end to the aggressive and often
biased process of progressive "child-saving." Now graced with a bourgeois,
Americanized adoptive home, the child could develop the proper values and civic
identities of the dominant classes.
IV. ADOPTION IN AN ERA OF CONSUMPTION

World War I extinguished much of the progressive fire that had burned in
the preceding decades, and "child-saving" efforts were less pronounced during the
"Roarin' Twenties" and Great Depression of the 1930s. However, adoption hardly
disappeared from the American scene. Between 1934 and 1944 adoptions increased
threefold to approximately 50,000 annually.6 Then, the number jumped even more
dramatically to roughly 175,000 by 1970.r A booming market for adoptable babies
emerged, and adoption was simply more common than ever before.
No single factor explains these changes, but it is possible to place
twentieth-century adoption into the context of consumption and acquisition. Private
consumption of goods, of course, dates back to the beginning of the Republic, but
historians have pointed to the 1920s as the decade in which the range of consumer

59

See PLATT, supra note 54, at 108-17.

60

See ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE, supranote 35, at 286.

61

See PLATT, supra note 54, at 109.

62

GROSSBERG, supra note 4, at 280.

63

See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF

CHILDREN 190 (1981; reprint 1985).
6

See id. at 190.

65

See MARGARET F. BRINIG ET AL., FAMILY LAW IN ACTION - A READER 106 (1999).
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goods and the magnitude of consumer demands became truly noteworthy.66
Advertising contributed to the demand by calling attention to products and by
extolling their attributes. More profoundly, advertising promoted "consumption as
a way of life. '" 7
What could be obtained through consumer purchases? Goods and services
are only the obvious answers. Advertising also suggested that through purchase and
acquisition "the age-old discontents of loneliness, sickness, weaknesses, lack of
sexual satisfaction" could be made to disappear.68 Advertising suggested as well
that new needs and doubts could be addressed, and, indeed, advertising seeks "to
generate new anxieties instead of allaying old ones.'9
In an historical period in which occupations, ethnic origins and religious
affiliations have declined in importance, consumption could indeed become central
in self-image and identity. Many are inclined to define themselves through the
goods they purchase and the presumed ways those goods respond to traditional or
newly constructed needs.70
What's more, advertising and the consumption it promotes spill over from
the literal consumer marketplace to other sectors not normally associated with the
purchase of goods, services and alleviation of personal problems. Print and
television "news," for example, is a commercial product, and its producers either
sell the product directly to consumers or rely on advertising sales related to the
product. Ronald Reagan was notorious for promoting his candidacies and
presidency with the well crafted "sound-bite," but almost thirty years earlier
Dwight Eisenhower raised eyebrows when he hired an advertising firm to promote
his political proposals and programs. Students in universities often approach their
courses and degrees as "consumer goods," and many professors speak openly of the
need to "market" the courses they are offering.
Certain childless adults or couples wanting children beyond the number
biology has provided fit into this large picture. In addition to purchasing their share
of conventional consumer goods, many also seek to obtain the child held out by
advertising and general cultural imagery as central to a good, successful life.
"Family" in contemporary America is taken to include children or at least a single
child. Adoption is a way to accomplish this goal.
Historians have noted that in the 1920s and 1930s well known
entertainment and political figures led the way with their public efforts to adopt.
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Newspapers reported on the efforts of Gracie Allen and George Bums, New York
City's Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, Babe Ruth, Eddie Rickenbacker and others to
adopt.7 Stage actress Minnie Maddem Fiske shared with the public her adoption of
a thirteen-month-old child, and the child made a stage debut in one of Fiske's
tours. 73 Al Jolson told his fans he was adopting because he thought it was "selfish
to go through life without children. 74 Selfishness, in other words, was the type of
personal flaw Jolson hoped to eliminate by acquiring a child.
Before long the traditional pattern of potentially adoptable children
outnumbering adopters was reversed, and a striking change also took place with
regard to adoption preferences. In earlier periods adoptive children might have been
young adults able to provide help on the farm or juvenile delinquents who needed
to be "rescued" from their ethnic families and lives of crime. But in the midst of the
twentieth-century adoption boom, infants became the most wanted adoptive
children. 75 Would-be parents were willing to spend large amounts of money for
babies, especially healthy, white babies. These babies constituted an economic
drain on their parents' assets; the babies had no economic value. But still, in the
context of what sociologist Viviana Zelizer calls the "sentimentalization of
adoption,, 76 would-be adoptive parents became willing to expend large amounts of
time and money on an infant, on "[t]he priceless child. 77
As in earlier parts of this article, one should acknowledge the frequency
with which adoption is indeed a warm and genuinely affectionate development for
adoptees and adoptive parents. Would-be adoptive parents may be imbued by a
need to acquire a child and a concomitant sense of familial wholeness, but this does
not prevent adoptive parents from becoming loving and nurturing parents. What is
intriguing, though, is the way legislators and judges have in the second half of the
twentieth century refined contemporary adoption law to facilitate and accommodate
the desires of people with satisfactory financial means to be adoptive parents.
This refinement begins with the various institutions legally sanctioned to
promote and proceed with adoptions. The significance of these agencies and
institutions involves not just locating and placing adoptable children. As will be
noted shortly, these institutions also proffer the authoritative statements regarding
the viability of a given adoption and the best interests of the child in the formal
adoption process.
Putting aside the special case of intra-family adoptions, the three major

72

See ZELIZER, supra note 63, at 191.

73

See id. at 190-91.

74

See id. at 191.

A Minnesota study revealed that the average age of the adopted child dropped from 24.61 months
between 1900-1917 to 6.89 months between 1918-1927. See Alice M. Leahy, A Study of Certain Selective
FactorsInfluencing Prediction of the Mental State of Adopted Children, 41 J. OF GENETIC PYSCH. 294, 300
75

(1932).
supranote 63, at 169-71, 201.

76

ZELIZER,

77

Id.at 193.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss2/8

12

Papke: Pondering Past Purposes: A Critical History of American Adoption

PONDERINGPAST PURPOSES

1999)

institutions for locating, placing and approving children for adoption are
government departments, non-profit agencies and private attorneys. The
departments are commonly welfare or child services departments operating on the
county level. The children these departments locate, at least in urban areas where
most adoptions take place, are frequently not the healthy, Caucasian infants
preferred by many adoptive parents. Instead, the children are often older, members
of minority groups, disabled or handicapped, or part of a sibling group. Sometimes
these children have indeed been removed from the homes of their neglectful or
abusive parents in the type of parental rights termination proceedings so favored by
turn-of-the-century "child-savers." In the hope of encouraging the adoption of socalled "hard to place" children from county welfare departments, federal and state
governments provide subsidies and tax breaks to those willing to adopt these
children. 78
Beyond county welfare departments, non-profit adoption agencies are
sanctioned in all states.79 Some of these agencies are religious in affiliation; some
are nonsectarian. Some specialize in the adoption of American children; some focus
on adoptions from abroad. In the World War II era these agencies customarily
asked for "donations" from adoptive parents, but in keeping with the impulses of
acquisition, the charges associated with adoptions through these agencies have long
since been recast as "fees." 80 The agencies have different standards and approaches,
but all of them work closely with would-be adoptive parents, counseling them and
supporting them in the adoption process and in the courtroom.
All but a handful of states also sanction adoptions handled by individual
adoption attorneys. These so-called "private adoptions" must ultimately pass
through the courts like other types of adoptions, but the directing institution is a
specialized subsection of the bar rather than a government department or non-profit
agency. In general, private adoptions are the most expensive of the three types, but,
intriguingly, this type of adoption is the fastest growing.
Why are private adoptions growing as a percentage of adoptions? Why is
this type of adoption likely to dominate in the future? The answer simply is that
adoptions managed and directed by a private attorney are most able to
accommodate adoptive parents' preferences.81 This type of adoption is the most
consumer-driven. While county welfare departments must balance the interests of
struggling biological families, children who have been removed from their homes,
and the preferences of those perhaps willing to adopt, private adoption attorneys
can listen chiefly to their paying clients, i.e., the would-be adoptive parents. While
78
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non-profit adoption agencies are to some extent guided by religious beliefs or
humanist philosophies, private adoption attorneys can abide by what the client
wants.
One might worry that private adoptions would slide into illegal or
borderline baby sales, and there are indications that this does go on. 02 But instead of
calls to restrict private adoptions, there are louder calls to defer even more fully to
consumer demands and market forces. Richard Posner and others have argued that
the open use of the market would make adoptions less expensive and more
efficient.83 Those who want to adopt could more easily locate biological parents
willing to place their children for adoption if we allowed advertising and
negotiating without bureaucratic limitations and societal disapproval. Posner's line
of thought has prompted objections,84 but he is hardly one to back down. In
response to the particular criticism that his approach sounds like slavery in its
willingness to market human beings, Posner asks us to be realistic. Of course this is
not slavery. The adopted children
would be free citizens and buoyed by warm and
85
loving new homes to boot.
When the sanctioned government department, non-profit agency or private
attorney has put an adoptable child together with would-be adoptive parents, the
adoption, in keeping with procedures first established in the second half of the
nineteenth century, moves to court. The standard process includes the filing of a
formal adoption petition, the entering of consents from biological parents, the
approval of social agencies, the passage of a stipulated period of time, and an
ultimate decree by the presiding judge that the adoption is in the best interests of
the child and can therefore be finalized.
One of the most worrisome parts of the formal process from the
perspective of people adopting is the obtaining of consents from the biological
parents. Often these consents are obtained early and easily, but occasionally the
consents are withheld, thereby stopping the adoption in its tracks and causing great
pain and disappointment for those who have come so close to fulfilling their desires
only to be, in their minds, denied and thwarted. When you want something very
badly in the context of a consumerist society, it actually hurts not to get it.
Legislators and judges have not gone so far as to simply dispense with
consents from biological parents, but the refinement of adoption law has included
features which makes the consents more secure and obtainable. Consents from
biological mothers, for example, could be susceptible to challenge because the
great majority of these mothers are young, unmarried and under great stress. But
82
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courts usually require traditional varieties of fraud or duress before they are willing
to invalidate a mother's consent.as Immaturity, lack of resources and pressure from
parents and other family members are all real and to some extent disabling, but
none of these rise to the level of fraud or duress.8 7 It is, as a result, extremely
difficult for a biological mother to withdraw her consent, and would-be adoptive
parents can for the most part breathe a sigh of relief when the signed consents are in
the court's hands.
Consents from biological fathers, meanwhile, present a whole different set
of potential problems. The United States Supreme Court ruled in Stanley v.
Illinois8 8 in 1972 that biological fathers cannot simply be left out of the picture. 9 A
state cannot presume them to be unfit or uninterested and disregard them in the
adoption process. But nevertheless, providing too many options and protections to
biological fathers could greatly slow and complicate adoption. Many of these
fathers have no interest in parenting, let alone being identified and having to pay
child support. Some have disappeared and cannot be located. The identities of
others are unknown due to the biological mothers' unwillingness to identify fathers
or intercourse with multiple and sometimes unknown men. Hence, states routinely
authorize constructive notice to these fathers in obscure legal publications the
fathers could not possible consult. Some states also presume unfitness for fathers
who fall into specific statutorily designated categories.9"
Perhaps the most revealing treatment of biological fathers' rights came
about after several highly publicized cases in which biological fathers came
forward later in the process saying they had not been notified or consulted with
regard to an adoption. The likes of the "Baby Jessica Case" and the "Baby Richard
Case" sent chills down the spines of those who had recently adopted without
unambiguous consent from a child's biological father. 91 Such highly publicized
cases also led those planning to adopt to wonder if it was worth doing, given what
appeared to be high risks. Legislatures in New York and other states responded by
establishing putative fathers' registries. 92 Men who think they may have fathered a
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child can register, and state officials then notify them if the child they think they
have fathered is placed for adoption. However - and this is the key for members of
the middle and upper classes thinking of adopting and to the legislation in general failure to register is seen under the law as a waiver of rights to notice, hearing and
consent.
As for the "best interests" standard, which is the key when a judge
finalizes an adoption, here, too, contemporary legislation and judicial interpretation
have led to protection for those who desire to adopt. "Best interests" in an adoption
is not the same as "best interests" in a contested child custody decision at the time
of divorce. In the latter situation the court frequently chooses between Parent A and
Parent B, both of whom might be quite ready and able to parent but one of whom
might be marginally better able to accommodate the child's "best interests." In
almost all adoptions, by contrast, the judge in a finalization hearing does not really
have two parenting options to weigh against one another. Rather, the child has been
placed for adoption, consents are in hand for the biological mother, a licensed
caseworker has conducted a home study, and a governmental department, nonprofit agency or adoption attorney has endorsed the finalization. The determination
that the adoption is in the child's best interests is virtually a foregone conclusion
and amounts to a conclusion by the judge that the proposed adoption seems
generally a good and prudent decision. The standard, in other words, is ideally
shaped in ways that serve the adoptive parents' wishes to adopt.
All of this, of course, is not enough to assure that each and every American
who has the resources to adopt can do so. There are, quite frankly, too few healthy,
white infants to accommodate the greatest demand. Some would-be parents run
into roadblocks on the way to adoption. But still, adoption law is not about to
disfavor would-be adoptive parents. The proposed Uniform Adoption Act, for
example, which would standardize adoption procedures from state to state,
promises more of the same. Carole Anderson, President of Concerned United
Birthparents, says of the Act: "It doesn't serve the needs of children. It wasn't
meant to, and it doesn't. It's an act for the convenience of people who want to
adopt healthy newborns. ' 3
V. CONCLUSION

The present does not supplant the past; it grows out of it. Adoption's
societal purpose is not completely different from one period to another but rather
concretes, shifts and evolves. We can in the present hear echoes of the purposes of
the past. We might also, by reflecting on the past, be better able to anticipate and
address the newest of trends.
In more specific terms, many in the present continue to distinguish
between biological and adoptive children, a distinction that would have made
perfect sense to American legislators, jurists and citizens in the second half of the
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nineteenth century. The distinctions are smaller and more subtle than they were in
the Antebellum Period or Gilded Age. The distinctions have less to do with
inheritance and more with assumptions and ascriptions. But the distinctions
continue to exist. Adoptive children and parents, for example, all encounter
instances in which well-intentioned friends or relatives ask about an adopted child's
"real mother." Parents with both biological and adoptive children, whom they
presume to love equally, might be surprised when someone casts only the former as
their "true" or "actual" children.
Echoing the progressive era's "child-savers," some in the present continue
to see adoption as a way children can be removed from undesirable settings and
placed in healthy, stable, morally upright homes. "Child-savers" of the late
twentieth century, for example, grew so eager to "rescue" Indian children from the
poverty and denial of reservations that Congress even stepped in with legislation to
protect tribal populations from overly eager adopters and their attorneys. 94 Black
social workers and community leaders also complained when "child-savers" began
looking with untoward gusto to the ghetto for adoptable children.95
In keeping with patterns of the mid- and late-twentieth century, members
of the middle and upper classes, of course, continue to search for those healthy,
white newborns who can fill out their lives, who will make them feel complete in
the context of a culture promoting images of family. Some contemporaries make a
firm and definite decision to be childless, but many more long for a child and take
whatever steps they can to acquire one. Adoption is the most common vehicle to
this end.
Looking to the future, we can anticipate a more international process of
child acquisition in which adoption will only be one approach. The number of
American pregnancies is lower than at any point in the last two decades, and an
estimated 22 percent of those pregnancies are terminated by abortions96 This
means that fewer domestic infants are available for adoption, and that would-be
adoptive parents will be more likely to look abroad. The number of foreign
adoptions is rising dramatically, and Americans are responsible for roughly twothirds of the international adoptions in the world.97 To some extent, these adoptions
are even more extreme examples of the middle and upper classes adopting the
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children of the poor, and critics have warned against the rush to foreign adoptions.98
Yet, given world inequalities, foreign adoptions by Americans will continue to
grow in number. Can "child-saving" of the future be internationalized without
becoming a variety of troubling child-centered imperialism?
Then, too, it seems likely that in the future middle and upper class
Americans will increasingly look to possibilities other than adoption for their much
desired children. Because of the declining number of healthy white babies,
adoptions in the United States have already declined since the 1970s, but
Americans instead are turning to artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and
other varieties of technology-assisted reproduction. Surrogacy will also become
increasingly common, especially as the states fully legalize it. Can acquisition of
children through these alternatives to adoption avoid becoming completely
commercialized and demeaning to the parties involved?
In conclusion, the critical contemplation of adoption history reveals a
complex, dynamic sociolegal institution. The concerns, tensions, and
transformations of various eras have affected adoption, and adoption in turn is a
revealing window on those earlier eras. In the future as well, the development of
adoption laws and purposes will continue to reveal our attitudes regarding children
and human relations in general.
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